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The German Rhineland is home to the world's largest opencast lignite coal mine and human-made hole
e the Hambach mine. Over the last seven years, RWE, the mine operator, has faced an increase in militant
resistance, culminating in the occupation of the Hambacher Forest and acts of civil disobedience and
sabotage. The mine provides a European case study to examine the repressive techniques deployed by
RWE to legitimise coal mining in the face of a determined opposition. Drawing on political ecology
literature and work on corporate counter-movements, this paper peers into extractive industries and
their corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagements through the lens of corporate counterinsurgency.
We ﬁrst provide some background to the mine and RWE's unique position in the German political
economy. After explaining the rise of resistance, the paper then discusses counterinsurgency in relation
to CSR by outlining the different techniques used to win the ‘hearts’ and ‘minds’ of people around the
mine. This includes securing the support of political leaders, lobbying, involvement in social events,
infrastructure projects, astroturf groups and ecological restoration/offsetting work, which combine with
overtly repressive techniques by public and private security forces that together attempt to legitimise the
mine and stigmatise, intimidate and criminalise activists. This paper contents that counterinsurgency
techniques are becoming normalised into the everyday operations of RWE, naturalising its image as
‘good corporate citizen’ and legitimising and invisibilising the violence towards (non)human nature
inherent in the corporate-state-mining-complex, as mining is becoming part of the ‘green economy’ and
made ‘sustainable’.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The German state of North Rhine Westphalia (NRW) is home to
the largest lignite coal deposit (55 billion tons) in Europe. The
Hambach minedone of three lignite mines in the region and
operated by RWE, Germany's leading electricity providerdis the
world's largest opencast lignite mine (Schmitz, 2006) and Europe's
‘biggest hole’ (Michel, 2005: 16). The Hambacher Forest, a highly
biodiverse old-growth forest, is currently being cleared to give way
to the expansion, or, in the words of RWE, the ‘migration’ of the
Hambach mine (Fig. 1). The displacement and resettlements of
homes, air pollution and environmental destruction necessary forl Relations, Centre for Global
ssex, UK.
a.d.dunlap@vu.nl (A. Dunlap).
r Ltd. This is an open access articlethe ‘migrating mine’ has triggered resistance, beginning in the
1970s and continuing into the present e with citizen initiatives,
mass-protests and a forest occupation attempting to block the
expansion of the mine. Environmental activists initiated a
campaign against RWE's three coal mines in the Rhineland, with
annual climate camps and mass-civil disobedience since 2010.
Others engage in human chains, demonstrations art performances,
nature walks and legal battles against RWE.
In April 2012, forest defenders occupied the neighbouring
Hambacher forest to stop the migrating mine. In November, over a
four-day period, they were forcefully removed by over 500 police
ofﬁcers in what is alleged to be one of the most expensive evictions
in German police history according to interviewees. Following the
eviction, a local resident bought land next to the forest to host a
permanent protest camp. Shortly thereafter, the Hambacher Forest
was reoccupied, and now serves as a permanent point of resistanceunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Fig. 1. The migrating mine, Perschke, 2012.
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protect the forest, while working to stop the migrating mine,
through road barricades, tree platforms, tree-spiking and the
placement of ‘potential improvised explosive devices; ’1 sabotage of
coal-transportation infrastructure (i.e. short circuiting power lines,
burning of pumping stations, radio-masts and electrical trans-
formers) and the ambushing of security-police patrols with stones,
slingshots, ﬁreworks andMolotov cocktails (Anonymous, 2016: 91).
At present, the encampment has been evicted (and reoccupied)
three times, with repeated reports of violent repression and even
claims of attempted vehicle manslaughter by RWE security in
January 20162 (Sch€onberg, 2016). Militant and peaceful protests
actions have been met with increasing repression by security and
police personnel. This violent repression, however, complements a
diversity of indirect corporate strategies to secure acceptance of,
and pacify resistance against the mine, including sustained
‘greening’ activities, public relations campaigns and corporate so-
cial responsibility measures that RWE has engaged in for decades.
Contributing to the growing political ecology literature of the
Global North (e.g. Schr€oder et al., 2006), the Hambach mine conﬂict
provides a European case study examining the repressive tech-
niques and ‘corporate social technologies’ (Rogers, 2012: 284) un-
dertaken by RWE to reshape the politics, social relations and
conceptions of ‘nature’ within communities to maintain opera-
tional legitimacy in the face of ecological crises, anthropogenic
climate change and determined opposition. Following the RAND
Corporation's National Security Division (Rosenau et al., 2009: 1),
we conceptualise these techniques and technologies as ‘corporate
counterinsurgency; ’ deﬁned as ‘ﬁrms’ efforts to mitigate violence
and promote stability through social development and security
measures' to ‘win hearts and minds’ of local populations. We argue
that these counterinsurgency techniques are composed of ‘soft’ and
‘hard’ tactics (Dunlap & Fairhead, 2014; Williams, 2007/2004),
which need to be analysed in conjuncture, to illustrate how the
former serve to invisibilise the latter. This approach allows us to1 Fake devices to keep police and security personnel out of the forest.
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼R_blumlDgAY.approach the often invisibilised and normalised violence inherent
in coal mining and industrial growth to further explore the
conﬂictive political geography of the migrating mine (Benjaminsen
et al., 2017).
Whereas conventional wisdom tends to point towards milita-
risation and ‘hard’ approaches, we recognise the proliferation and
corporate adaptation of civil-military (counterinsurgency) tech-
niques e integrating greening, social development and corporate
communication with more repressive measures e in their respec-
tive contexts to respond to opposition. ‘One of the deﬁning features
of contemporary [mining] capitalism,’ Stuart Kirsch (2010) has
argued in his seminal work on ‘sustainable mining,’ ‘is the way
corporations respond to their critics’ e co-opting and integrating
their discourses without changing their operations. It is from this
perspective of counterinsurgency that we analyse the operations of
RWE around the Hambach Forest and beyond.
This paper proceeds, ﬁrstly, by introducing the employed con-
ceptual and methodological approach, and by providing some
background on RWE, the Hambach mine and their political activ-
ities e from EU lobbying to collaboration with municipal politi-
cians. We then move to analyse the ‘engineering of consent’
through examining the multiple ‘soft’ counterinsurgency tech-
niques that heavily rely on public relations (PR) strategies,
‘neoliberal social development’ and ‘greening.’ Subsequently, we
examine the way nature restoration and offsetting legitimises
RWE's operations, and, in conjunction with other techniques,
fashions RWE as a ‘good corporate citizen.’ This is followed by an
analysis of RWE's ‘harder’ counterinsurgency techniques which
involve the criminalisation, repression and violence against forest
defenders. We conclude that by entrenching state/corporate power
and violence, an integrated approach involving hard and soft
counterinsurgency techniques further intensiﬁes the current tra-
jectory of industrial progress responsible for biodiversity loss and
climate crisis.
2. Counterinsurgency and extractivism: approaching the
forest
Peering into extractive industries through the lens of
3 The NO TAV (No to the High-Speed Train) movement is based in the Susa Valley,
Italy, and opposes the EU project that connects a new high-speed railway between
Turin and Lyon, France. See http://www.notav.info/.
4 This is a high-grade gold-copper porphyry mine located in northern Greece and
run by Eldorado Gold.
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literature examining corporate counter-movements. While oppo-
sition to resource extraction operations has attracted considerable
scholarly interest (Ballard and Banks, 2003; Bebbington et al., 2008;
Borras et al., 2012; Gedicks, 1994; Hall et al., 2015), corporate
counter-movements working to defuse resistance to extraction
operations remain a neglected topic, despite becoming the focus of
a growing body of literature in critical sociology (Austin, 2002;
Lubbers, 1999, 2002, 2012; Rowell, 2007), organisational
(Kraemer, Whiteman, & Banerjee, 2013) and communication
studies (Bsumek et al., 2014). Complementing this research, we
adopt the framework of ‘corporate counterinsurgency’ or counter-
insurgency more broadly to assess corporate counter-movements,
as they relate to joint public-private security operations akin to
those employed by Rio Tinto in Bougainville (Lasslett, 2014), and,
more recently, by Energy Transfer against the Standing Rock anti-
pipeline encampment in the United States (US) (Brown, Parrish, &
Speri, 2017). We contend that the practices used by security ser-
vices to target anti-capitalist, anarchist and environmental social
movements, branded by governments as ‘extremist’ and ‘terrorist’
(Europol, 2008, 2014, 2016), constitute counterinsurgency ap-
proaches in their respective political and social contexts.
Thus, research on corporate counter-movements illustrates the
techniques of domestic counterinsurgency operations to defuse
protests and potential ‘insurgencies’ against ‘critical infrastructure’
(Europol, 2016: 8). Recognising techniques and strategies deployed
against social movementsdmilitant or otherwisedas counterin-
surgency resituates the current state of affairs of ‘democratic’ pol-
itics, while also leading to a practical and analytical reassessment of
corporate and governmental activities that aim to socially ‘engi-
neer’ political terrain to manufacture consent and normalise so-
cially and ecologically destructive activities.
Counterinsurgency is deﬁned by David Kilcullen (2006, pp. 29,
31) as ‘a competition with the insurgent for the right and ability to
win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population,’ where
‘hearts’ are explained as ‘persuading people their best interests are
served by your success’ and ‘minds,’ ‘convincing them that you can
protect them, and that resisting you is pointless.’ Counterinsur-
gency is a type of ward‘low-intensity’ or ‘asymmetrical’ combat-
dand style of warfare that emphasises intelligence networks,
psychological operations, media manipulation, security provision
and social development that seeks to maintain governmental
legitimacy (FM3-24, 2014). Emerging from the colonial wars,
counterinsurgency theory has become increasingly popular, gain-
ing widespread application within militaries (Owens, 2015), police
departments (Williams, 2007/2004; Williams, Munger, &
Messersmith-Glavin, 2013; Nomad, 2016), forest conservation
(Lunstrum, 2014; Marijnen & Verweijen, 2016; Peluso &
Vandergeest, 2011; Verweijen & Marijnen, 2016), and even mar-
keting agencies (Copulsky, 2011).
Counterinsurgency campaigns and techniques are also central to
the operations of resource extraction companies, yet this compo-
nent remains largely neglected in extraction scholarship. High-
lighting the relationship between violence and extractive
industries, Downey, Bonds, and Clark (2010) argue: ‘armed violence
is a key driver of the global ecological crisis and that this is likely the
case because other key drivers of natural resource exploitation,
such as the IMF, World Bank, WTO, and global marketplace, cannot,
on their own, guarantee core nation access to and control over vital
natural resources.’ Behind this practice of armed violence lies
counterinsurgency doctrine, which has been key to stabilizing
extraction sites (Brown et al., 2017; Dunlap, 2017a; Dunlap &
Fairhead, 2014; Rosenau et al., 2009). At the 2011 oil conference
in Texas, Matt Carmichael, manager of external affairs for Anadarko
Petroleum, recommended to Public Relations experts to ‘[d]ownload the US Army-slash-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency
Manual’, calling opposition to hydraulic fracturing in the US ‘an
insurgency’ (Javers, 2011). Echoing Carmichael, Matt Pitzarella ad-
mits: ‘We have several former psy ops folks that work for us at
Range [Resources] because they're very comfortable in dealing with
localized issues and local governments' (Javers, 2011).
The latest US Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM)
3-24 (2014: 1e2) explains: ‘When a population or groups in a
population are willing to ﬁght to change the condition to their
favor, using both violent and nonviolent means to affect a change in
the prevailing authority, they often initiate an insurgency. An in-
surgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize,
nullify, or challenge political control of a region.’ Security author-
ities, following Brigadier General Kitson's (1971/2010) advice, have
come to view opposition in different stages of proto-insurgent ac-
tivity: the ‘preparatory period’ and ‘non-violence phase,’ which are
viewed as precursors to an ‘insurgency’ that challenges the legiti-
macy and operations of governments and resource extraction
companies (Dunlap, 2014; Dunlap & Fairhead, 2014). This leads
authorities to respond with various pre-emptive and sustained
efforts, mixing concession and coercion to defuse social move-
ments and their consequent disruptions of business. It is from this
perspective that we analyse the operations of RWE, looking at how
so-called ‘insurgency’ is deﬁned and how governments and com-
panies collaborate to legitimise their operations and ‘pacify’
opposition.
Since at least 2002 the EU's law enforcement agency, Europol,
has been targeting left-wing, anarchist, animal rights, environ-
mental and climate activists (Monroy, 2011). The Europol: Terrorism
Situation and Trend Report (Europol, 2008, pp. 7, 2014: 36, 2016: 43)
places protests, vandalism, ‘blockades and “lock-ons”’ against
resource extraction companies and large-scale infrastructure pro-
jects like the ‘NoTAV’movement3 and the Skouriesmine4 under the
label of ‘single-issue terrorism.’ This classiﬁcation has justiﬁed
surveillance and the use of undercover police and informants
(Lubbers, 2012; Monroy, 2011; Williams et al., 2013). Importantly,
surveillance of animal rights, environmental and no-border activ-
ists is done under the pretext of ‘information gathering and threat
prevention’ (Monroy, 2011: 1) and goes hand in hand with the
intensiﬁcation of police logistics (e.g. transborder cooperation) and
the tailoring of terrorist charges for social movements (Kitson,
2010; Monroy, 2011). We see a signiﬁcant overlap here with
counterinsurgency logics, in particular, how protest and dissident
groups are discursively separated from ‘the population’ and
labelled as ‘the enemy’, and how this justiﬁes the use of both co-
ercive and non-coercive methods. Kristian Williams (2007) makes
the distinction between ‘hard’ (direct) repressive counterinsur-
gency practices and ‘soft’ (indirect) counterinsurgency approaches
consisting of investing resources and technologies into ‘underde-
veloped’ or ‘troubled’ areas, often referred to as ‘civilian assistance’
and ‘community development.’ This includes aid to collaborating
local elites, ofﬁcials and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) to
stabilise and mitigate conﬂict in areas of interest. Furthermore,
Dunlap and Fairhead (2014) and McQueen (2015) link military
practices to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs.
Building on their work, this paper argues that RWE's CSR, PR and
ecological initiatives like offsetting and recultivation accomplish
the same goals as ‘soft’ counterinsurgency strategies that seek to
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mine. These indirect approaches work in accordance with direct
repressive techniques to suppress resistance and criminalise and
isolate activists, while entrenching RWE's political power and im-
age as ‘good corporate citizen.’ The result is normalising and
‘rendering invisible’ the state-corporate violence against popular
resistance, and the ‘slow violence’ inherent in ‘fossil capitalism’ e
against the earth (Nixon, 2011), its inhabitants and especially those
who are already marginalised, living in areas particularly affected
by climate change, or close to mining sites.
Research was conducted around the Hambach mine between
January 2016 and March 2017. This inquiry is based on participant
observation, 15 semi-structured and countless informal interviews
with individuals involved in the resistance against the mine,
(former) RWE employees, public authorities and neighbouring
residents.5 Interviews were complemented by an analysis of rele-
vant policy documents, nongovernmental reports, media articles
and RWE documents and website content, translated by Andrea
Brock where needed. Participant observation included attending
RWE's guided tours through coal mines and recultivated/offset
areas, the 2017 recultivation conference, other outreach events and
visits to RWE information points. Lastly, to understand the social
and ecological degradation caused by the mine, extended site visits
were made e cycling and walking along the edges of the mine,
through the (abandoned) villages, ancient forest and recultivation
sites. This research examines the practices of the company, which
means studying its actionsd‘political reactions “from above”’
(Geenen & Verweijen, 2017: 2)dand relating these to established
military and police doctrine to develop research into the political
geography of environmental conﬂict.3. The migrating mine
Excavation of the Hambachmine began in 1978 and is scheduled
to be completed by 2045. The total mining area covers 85 km2 or
8,500ha (RWE Power, 2014). The mine deposit holds some 2.5
billion tons of coal, with current annual extraction at 43 million
tons (RWE Power, 2014), which involves the shifting of around six
times as much soil (overburden). In total, the mine extracts more
than one million tons of coal and cubic metres of overburden a day
(Schmitz, 2006). RWE is the single largest European emitter,
responsible for twelve percent of CO2 emissions in Germany (IWR,
2012), and between the three Rhinish mines produces fourteen
percent of all electricity in Germany (RWE Power AG, nd).
Throughout its lifetime, the Hambach mine has been responsible
for the resettlement of six villages, displacing over 5000 people and
creating social tensions in the displaced communities (BUND, nd;
Jansen, interview). By 2026, a total of 42,000 people will have
lost their homes in the Rhinish coal region (dpa, 2016).
Half of the landscape that once covered the mine area was
forested and rich in biodiversity. Fifty percent of the formerly
forested areas consisted of deciduous forests (up to 12,000 years
old) ‘with the highest structural diversity and biodiversity
composition in the region, and also likely to harbour species of
special interest and concern’ (Imboden & Moczek, 2015: 15). The
Hambacher Forest e historically managed as communal land e
constitutes what German biologists call aMaigl€ockchen-Stieleichen-
Hainbuchenwald e a type of forest that is protected under Annex 15 Unravelling the methods that secure corporate operations is difﬁcult because of
the secretive nature of business (Lubbers, 2012). Finding this information creates
risks for those collaborating with the research projectdwhether working within
the company or resisting itdand requires privileged information, which often
emerges in the form of leaked documents.of the EU Habitats Directive (Jansen, interview). It is home to the
endangered middle-spotted woodpecker, protected under Annex 1
of the EU Birds Directive, as well as the Bechstein's bat, agile frog,
and hazel dormouse, among others.
For the clearing of the Hambacher Forest, the mining company is
legally required under the German Nature Protection Law (Natur-
schutzgesetz) and the European Habitats Directive not only to
recultivate the mining area, but to implement additional compen-
sation measures, or offsets (Ausgleichsmaßnahmen). RWE's
compensation measures for the Bechstein's bat include 700ha of
‘bat infrastructure’ to connect remaining fragments of old wood-
land surrounding the mine and a V4 million ‘green bridge’ over the
nearby A61 highway to serve ‘as a crossing aid for the bats from
Hambach Forest’ (RWE AG, 2015b). Aside from the so-called ‘bat-
highways’, the Hambach mine biodiversity management plan in-
cludes the newly recultivated area Sophienh€ohe, former agricultural
land located just North of the mine. The Sophienh€ohe is an artiﬁcial
low mountain range, covering 13 km2, with a height of 280 m and
praised for its ecological success in recreating habitat for a number
of (threatened) species e as well as, coincidentally, a convenient
way to dispose of the initial 2.2 billion m3 overburden that were
generated in the ﬁrst six years of mining operation (Imboden &
Moczek, 2015). This mountain of ‘overburden’ has been restored
and reforested following reclamation, blending and depositing of
soil. Despite its rich ecological diversity and newly created eco-
systems e including local biodiversity hotspots and unique bio-
topes e it cannot compensate for the loss of the Hambacher Forest
(Jansen, interview). According to Imboden and Moczek's ecological
assessments (2015: 18) “it might take 100 years for the new forests
to equal the rich biodiversity of the ancient woodland, particularly
the old growth oak stands.”
Today, recultivation work is undertaken by RWE's recultivation
research centre in collaboration with the Cologne Bureau for Fau-
nistics and countless volunteers. The research centre is not only
responsible for the planning and implementation of RWE's recul-
tivation work but appears to undertake PR and stakeholder
outreach, promoting the company's biodiversity management to
external parties, student groups and politicians. In tours, brochures
and promotional videos it is claimed that ‘the mine does not
expand, it migrates.’ On their website, the recultivation research
centre describes this process: ‘First came the diggers… then nature
returns’ (Forschungsstelle Rekultivierung, 2016). Underlying the
mine's PR material is the reduction of ecosystem quality to that of
quantity (Sullivan, 2009, 2010), transforming the natural environ-
ment into a series of numerical signiﬁers to facilitate the legiti-
misation of the mine as ‘temporary use of the land’ and the popular
claim, displayed in RWE's communication material, that the mine
will leave no permanent impact, and indeed a ‘net gain of trees’.
4. RWE’S political power: lobbying and revolving doors
Lignite coal electricity generation was elevated to ‘strategic
military status’ in Nazi Germany under the 1935 Law for Promoting
the Energy Industry, adopted to strengthenwartime capabilities and
enable the eviction of entire communities for coal excavation
(Michel, 2005: 29). Despite pledges to remove all Nazi laws from
the books, Michel (2005: 29) argues, ‘the spirit of these wartime
expediencies prevails in many energy regulations to this day.’ The
Federal Mining Act, revised in 1980, stipulates the ‘compulsory
relinquishment of private property to mining companies […] by
eminent domainwhenever public welfare is served, particularly for
providing the market with raw materials, securing employment in
the mining industry, stabilizing regional economies, or promoting
sensible and orderly mining procedures’ (Michel, 2005, pp. 41-2).
Placing mining as a ‘national security interest’ and mandating the
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state-enforced resource extraction (Dunlap & Fairhead, 2014;
Gedicks, 1994; Sullivan, 2013).
RWE is the largest German electricity provider and leading
utility holding company (RWE AG, 2015a), which historically held
monopoly control over the (West) German electricity grid (Spiegel,
1979). In July 2011, Jürgen Grobmann, then- CEO exclaimed: ‘What
is good for RWE, is good for the public coffers’6 (VKA-RWE, 2012)
reﬂecting how corporations surreptitiously position their interest
as the ‘higher good’ (Dugger, 1989). In Germany, the industry also
invokes fears of blackouts and de-industrialisation that will lead to
‘primitivism’ (i.e. Focus, 2011; interviews). Yet the claim that RWE's
operations beneﬁt the public coffers disregards the German envi-
ronmental ministry's ﬁndings that roughly one billion euro/year
subsidies are provided to lignite power production, in addition to
the ﬁnancial burden of environmental and health detriments of at
least 3.5 billion euro/year (Lechtenb€ohmer, Kristof, & Irrek, 2004).
Additionally, BUND estimates that up to 50 percent of resettlement
costs in the Rhineland are born by the state and municipalities
(Lechtenb€ohmer et al., 2004).
Analysing the continuing political importance of mining in
Germany, Michel (2005: 77) argues that: ‘The German lignite in-
dustry operates on the premise of overt political inﬂuence,’ a skill
undoubtedly mastered by RWE. One research participant goes so
far as to claim that RWE is ‘the single most inﬂuential corporation
in the German political landscape.’ Already in 1979, the German
newsmagazine Spiegelwarned: ‘Unrivalled and barely manageable,
RWE is ruling over one of the largest monopolies of the Western
world’ (Spiegel, 1979). In the 1970s, municipalities held 60 percent
of shareholder voting rights in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and
thus had a signiﬁcant say in corporate decision making (Spiegel,
1979). The strength of municipality decision making has made
them important collaborators to legitimising RWE activities in
NRW. Currently, 32 municipalities, 20 cities, seven associations and
ﬁrmsdlarge banks, insurances and the NRW Chamber of Agri-
culturedare RWE shareholders. The high level of ﬁnancial entan-
glement and shared interests has helped RWE enforce its
objectives, exerting political inﬂuence even when these appear to
contradict governmental/public interests (Gründiger, 2016; Hissel,
2015; Liedtke, 2006; Spiegel, 1979).
Gerald Neubauer (2013) mapped the relationship between
German politicians and the coal industry, exposing 17 high-level
politicians spanning the political spectrum with close ties to RWE
e as board chairs or board members e even in environmental
ministries. Two leading politicians resigned in 2004 when it was
exposed that they had been receiving payments from RWE of
60,000e81,000 Euro/year (Neuber, 2004) and one GermanMember
of European Parliament, active in the Environment Committee, had
to step down from RWE's advisory council in 2015 (Bank, 2015).
Currently, two of RWE's board members hold seats in the German
parliament or Landtag.
Nationally, RWE has been at the forefront of lobbying efforts
against the German energy transition (Energiewende) and for the
extension of the operational lifespan of coalmines and nuclear
power plants, together with the inﬂuential neoliberal ‘cross sector
cross party NGO’ Initiative New Social Market Economy,7 in which it
plays a leading role. RWE's political inﬂuence testiﬁes to an
entrenched ‘private-public partnership’ with the German state,
which, as we shall further describe below, deeply shapes the
‘managing’ of dissent and the ‘engineering’ of consent around the
Hambach mine.6 “Je besser es RWE geht, desto voller sind die Stadts€ackl”.
7 http://www.insm.de/insm/ueber-die-insm/FAQ/english.html.4.1. RWE in the Rhineland
There is a unique structural dependency of local municipalities
in the Rhineland on RWE's ﬁnancial wellbeing. Just under twenty-
ﬁve percent of RWE's shares are owned by local authorities (VKA-
RWE, 2012), which makes local authorities not only licensers,
shareholders and clients, but also RWE constituencies, employees
and tax collectors. Refusal to license operations or grant permits
would thus negatively impactmunicipalities' ability to ﬁnance their
budgets. RWE has been driving the privatisation of public utility
companies, acquiring between twenty and seventy-ﬁve percent of
shares (Rügemer, 2006), and through its subsidiaries RWE is
involved in municipal electricity, gas and water distribution net-
works and street lighting systems (RWE Group, 2015: 89).
Furthermore, in 2004 it was exposed that RWE convenes so-called
‘regional advisory councils’ through which the company has been
paying over 100 local politicians some 600,000 Euro/year (Spiegel
Online, 2005). Financial payments by corporations to regional
politicians e serving on boards of directors or (regional) advisory
bodies e are explicitly legal under German law (Rügemer, 1997),
and have been criticised by a previous minister of labour as
‘legalised corruption’ (Spiegel, 1979).
During our research in the Hambach area, we found ample ev-
idence of corporate-political entanglements at the municipal level.
‘They are everywhere,’ explains one research participant, and
continues that RWE did really well ‘to get people into all [the po-
litical] positions thatmatter […]. Wherever decisions are taken, you
ﬁnd people who work for RWE or have worked for RWE.’ Whether
it's the city council or the local church council, several interviewees
report, RWE has managed to inﬁltrate almost all local decision-
making bodies. This goes beyond astroturﬁng and proxy NGOs
(discussed later), amounting to the appropriation of the structures
of governance themselves. In the city council of Kerpen near the
Hambach mine, a member of a local citizens' initiative explains,
thirteen of the former twenty-three members of the Social Dem-
ocratic Party were current or former RWE employees. According to
activists, the personal entanglement between RWE and local poli-
tics, as well as its omnipresence within local political and social
institutions, makes opposition ‘muchmore difﬁcult.’ Local churches
for instance, although supportive of the resistance, do not publicly
voice their support, as one research participant states: ‘[Y]ou will
be held accountable for these decisions; ’ residents working for
RWE will ‘watch you,’ noting who helps the ‘rowdies’ or ‘people
from “the forest.”’ Similarly, a local activist explains that criticising
resettlement in Manheim was difﬁcult because: ‘RWE's former
executive chairman is married to Manheim's mayor. His brother
was chairman of the citizens' council and contractor. He proﬁted
ﬁnancially [from resettlement…]. It's like a maﬁa.’
The ‘public-private partnership,’ emblematic of neoliberal con-
tracting (Hildyard, 2016), between the company and the German
state can also be observed in the close relations between RWE and
the police. The head of the local police responsible for controlling
the August 2015 Ende Gel€ande mass direct action against the
Hambach mine, for instance, was a member of RWE's advisory
board until two days before the protest action (CEO, 2015). The
police have been criticised for using RWE vehicles to patrol the
mine and transport arrestees (Blume, 2015; interviews) etestifying
to a ‘private-public partnerships in the security realm’ (Hissel,
2015). Activists have also reported close police-RWE collaboration
in operations in the Hambacher Forest. In addition, the NRW police
force is controlled by the state's parliamentary Interior Committee.
One of its most active members is Gregor Golland, an MP doubling
as RWE employee with an annual corporate salary of up to
V120,000 e only slightly less than his government salary of
V128.712 (Funken, 2016a). Not only is he a deputy member of the
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information which could affect RWE (abgeordnetenwatch, 2016),
but he is also responsible for internal security and police deploy-
ment e including major police operations in the Hambacher Forest.
The merging of state and corporate (security) apparatuses signals a
level of integrated cooperation that is typical to counterinsurgency
operations.
5. CSR, PR and outreach: exploring RWE’S ‘soft’
counterinsurgency strategies
‘Hard’ approaches to counterinsurgency are costly both
economically and reputationally. This necessitates developing ap-
proaches that pre-empt resistance and mitigate conﬂict to avoid
costly disruptions, sabatoge and police and/or military expendi-
tures. Reliance on ‘soft’ approaches includes PR, CSR and greening
initiatives that intertwine with ‘neoliberal social development’ and
popular environmental concerns and regulations. Echoing the
godfather of PR, Edward Bernays (1947), Kilcullen (2006: 33)
stresses the importance in counterinsurgency operations of
administering ‘a simple, unifying, easily-expressed story or expla-
nation that organizes people's experience and provides a frame-
work for understanding events.’ Communication theorist Harold
Lasswell (1934-5: 524), explains that ‘propaganda’ ‘is cheaper
than violence, bribery and other possible control techniques,’ or, as
Paul Virilio (1995: 14) writes, ‘[b]eating an enemy involves not so
much capturing as captivating them.’ PR constitutes a struggle for
the hearts and minds of people e whether to pledge loyalty to
corporate brands or ‘engineer consent’ for megaprojects e which
becomes visible in contestations over natural resources, whether
traditional fossil fuels or renewable resources (Dunlap, 2017a,
2017b).
PR measures are often integrated into CSR initiatives that enable
(mining) corporations to accumulate and exercise power (Rajak,
2011). These initiatives converge with ‘soft’ corporate counterin-
surgency, as they culminate into a strategy that ‘obscures
corporate-led environmental degradation, attempts to render
resistance illegitimate, and strategically divides communities’
(Dunlap & Fairhead, 2014: 957). We develop this point further, by
demonstrating that CSR is not only an indirect method of coun-
terinsurgency, but a type of military ‘hold’ strategy designed
around what is called ‘Integrated Monetary Shaping Operations’
(FM3-24: 10-11-14). Crucial to ‘hold’ strategies is the articulation of
‘information operation activities’ to build ‘bonds with the local
population and in many cases change the attitudes of the people’
(FM3-24, 2014: 9-7). ‘Hold’ strategies also imply distributing
money to ‘socially engineer’ the political terrain to garner legiti-
macy for governments, security forces and corporations, while
simultaneously undermining oppositional forces (FM3-24, 2014).
Corporate counterinsurgency ‘hold’ strategies rely heavily on in-
tegrated monetary shaping operations. Former World Bank
consultant Gavin Hilson recommends a variety of strategies to
mitigate resistance to extraction projects: the ‘implementation of
re-skilling programs; ’ the ‘establishment of small and medium
sized enterprises; ’ ‘Educational and Training Facilities; ’ and
‘infrastructure projects such as road and rail development, hospital
and school construction, and housing development’ (Hilson &
Murck, 2000: 230). While social development is usually associ-
ated with the Global South, rather than economically prosperous
countries like Germany, similar strategies can be observed in the
Rhineland.
Reﬂecting trends in nature conservation and payment for
ecosystem services, we contend that the forms of development
promoted by corporations in the framework of CSR, including
recreational opportunities and eco-tourism development, haveincreasingly taken on a neoliberal streak e presented as ‘win-win’
solutions that promote corporate and community interests
(Büscher, Sullivan, Neves, Igoe, & Brockington, 2012; Springer,
2016), anchored in ‘spectacle’ to normalise socially and environ-
mentally destructive practices (Cavanagh & Benjaminsen, 2014;
Igoe, Neves, & Brockington, 2010). Working with these ‘specta-
cles,’ ecotourism draws attention to how the ‘green economy’ has
become another ingredient in producing corporate images that
assist in ‘pacifying’ political opposition to resource extraction pro-
jects (Dunlap& Fairhead, 2014). The ‘win-win spectacle’ is manifest
in the various eco-touristic, recreational, cultural and educational
developments around the Hambach mine, based on a diversity of
greening activities including nature restoration and infrastructural
developments. These activities form part of the soft counterinsur-
gency strategies to win ‘hearts and minds’ of local residents, hikers,
cyclists, nature lovers and mine tourists. Observing similar dy-
namics in relation to the US Navy, Bigger and Neimark (2017)
highlight how ‘greening’ ultimately serves military objectives. The
following outlines the various monetary shaping operations
deployed to make the Hambach mine politically feasible in the face
of ecological crises, climate change and a determined opposition.
5.1. Corporate communication and astroturﬁng: ‘engineering
consent’?
Since the approval of the initial plan for the Hambach mine,
RWE has invested heavily in PR work to delegitimise opposition
groups and win the (‘asymmetric') ‘PR war’ for the hearts and
minds of the general public (McQueen, 2015: 104). In the early
1980s, RWE spent considerable ﬁnancial resources to dispel public
concerns about ‘irreparable ecological consequences’ that had been
raised by government authorities and environmental groups
(Spiegel, 1982). In 1980, the environmental ministry supressed a
studywarning of the disastrous ecological impacts of coal mining in
the region (including biodiversity loss, ecosystem degradation and
desertiﬁcation) that doubted RWE's ability to recultivate the area
(Spiegel, 1982). This highlights how corporate PR strategies do not
only involve promotion but also work via censorship, which also
affect the domain of ‘science.’
To improve its corporate communication and ‘manage’ opposi-
tion, RWE undertook a large-scale acceptance study, The Power of
Participation, to explore how stakeholder engagement and dialogue
can ‘avoid or reduce resistance’ against megaprojects, as ‘the future
viability of our business also depends on it’ (RWE AG, 2012: 19, 6).
In addition to such media and outreach campaigns, RWE built up
their own channels to promote its image and message in schools,
public events, museums, exhibitions, information centres and
tourist sites. In their permanent exhibition in the 16th century
castle Schloss Pfaffendorf, RWE host a museum about coal mining,
with interactive exhibits and a big screen ﬁfteen-minute video
explaining coal mining technologies, safety precautions and their
recultivation work. RWE rents out the castle for weddings, Christ-
mas parties, corporate and other events, and hosts free concerts
during the summer. Likewise, in the Innovative Information Centre
Niederaußem the company distributes their research on CO2
‘cleaning technologies’ and displays ‘tomorrow's technologies' in
an interactive exhibition. Next to, or rather above the edge of the
Garzweiler mine, RWE built a skywalk to provide ‘the perfect
panorama of coal mining processes, dumping of overburden and
power stations’ (RWE Generation, 2015: 28). This communicative
social infrastructure supports RWE's efforts to reach target audi-
ences, promote desirable opinions, and sustain speciﬁc types of
behaviour, which work towards ensuring a favourable public
opinion to maintain political stability.
Another technique adopted by RWE to shape popular and
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roots groups and campaigns to inﬂuence public opinion and lobby
local decision makers for new legislation and regulations favour-
able to corporate interests (Austin, 2002; Bsumek et al., 2014;
Kraemer et al., 2013; Peter, 2002; Williams et al., 2013: 214).
Already in the 1990s, RWE funded initiatives to resist wind energy
development, although, ironically, it now invests in wind energy
through their subsidiary ‘Innogy’ (Peter, 2002). The company has
continued to resort to astroturﬁng to safeguard their lignite mining
activities, being for example involved in a supposedly independent
citizens' initiative to defend lignite coal in the Rhineland under the
slogan: ‘Our revier e our future’ (Müller, 2016; Unser Revier, n.d.).
The initiative claims to oppose the lobbying efforts of NGOs and
‘aggressive environmental groups’ (Unser Revier, nd), but it was
quickly revealed that it has close ties to RWE. Additionally, RWE has
been involved in setting up two Facebook groups in which mine
supporters regularly call for violence and abuse against the forest
defenders, an approach also used by oil companies in the US
(Brown et al., 2017; Bsumek et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2013), as
further discussed below.
5.2. Omnipresent sponsorship: buying consent?
RWE's CSR may best be characterised by what one research
participant called ‘omnipresent sponsorship.’ RWE is ‘everywhere,’
local activists explain, with its tentacles spread out ‘like an octopus,’
fusing itself into the cultural and economic life around the mines.
The company has ‘inﬁltrated’ the social fabric of surrounding towns
through sponsorship of local events and associations, seeking to
gain legitimacy through the local authorities they sponsor. One
channel of such ‘inﬁltration’ is the corporate volunteering initiative,
RWE Companius, which ﬁnances initiatives and gives paid leave to
employees participating in regional projects (Bertelsmann Stiftung,
2010)d over 1300 projects in 2015 (RWE Companius, 2016). Pro-
jects include caring for the elderly and raising awareness among
RWE employees about child malnourishment to encourage dona-
tions. The company is explicit about its aims of these initiatives:
increasing a positive perception ofe and identiﬁcationwithe RWE
(RWE Companius, 2016). The scheme is accompanied by ‘promo-
tional material’ in the form of ﬂyers, posters and information stalls
in front of RWE canteens and inside children's day care centres,
which constitute an opportunity to spread its message outside its
usual channels. What RWE does not promote publicly, however, is
their membership in the Initiative New Social Market Economy (and
other associations) that advocates for the same neoliberal austerity
policies (cutting social spending, taxes and privatisations) that
entrench people's dependence on the private sector (Speth, 2004),
which makes RWE's charity work necessary in the ﬁrst place.
RWE also sponsors events organized by police and ﬁre de-
partments (e.g. barbeques), bouncy castles, ‘mobile fun centres’,
school events, carnival associations, parades, traditional festivals
(Schützenfeste), local football clubs and sports events for students. It
donated 129 public bookshelves and ﬁnances a ‘baking cart’ that
drives across the country handing out baked goods, recipes, RWE
material, and electricity saving information. Every couple of
months RWE offers tours through their mines, usually attended by
hundreds of people, including visitors from neighbouring towns
and countries. The events are promoted by local tourist associations
and websites, while local groups, such as the Johanniter-Unfallhilfe
and the Schützenverein, sell cake, sausages, coffee and beer to mine
tourists. The company also organizes tours through their power
stations and hires a nature guide to offer regular hikes through the
recultivated Sophienh€ohe (while a nature guide from the resistance
takes people through the Hambacher Forest). These sponsorships,
which, we believe, amount to Integrated Monetary ShapingOperations, position the company as ‘good corporate citizen’ in the
region and lend it a high level of legitimacy despite the high social,
ﬁnancial and ecological impacts of the mine. As a corollary, the
resistance movement is slowly delegitimised.
5.3. RWE in schools: generational engagement?
Much of RWE's CSR and PR work takes place in and around
schools. Since 1998, the RWE Foundation has supported disad-
vantaged children and provided educational/PR material, teaching
supplies e such as role-playing gamese and lunchboxes to ﬁrst-
graders, having distributed over 742,000 boxes since 2006 (Wahl,
2015). Additionally, RWE supports the popular (and prestigious)
youth research initiatives Jugend forscht and Schüler exper-
imentieren, while also offering ‘Learn & Fun’ school trips into its
power plants and ‘girls’ days' in its training centres (3malE, n.d.).
School projects are supported with up to V60,000 for educational
games and student competitions (3malE, n.d.), which, according to
the company, bring in new, innovative ideas. This anchors positive
associations with RWE among children. Furthermore, the company
helps design school programs related to energy efﬁciency to create
connotations with climate protection and ‘progressiveness’
(Kamella, 2013). In a similar vein, RWE sponsors the ‘Duisburg RWE
Zoo School’ in the nearby zoo, where it offers ‘lively biology lessons’
by ‘zoo pedagogues’ to 10,000 students/year (Zoo Duisburg AG,
2016) e while destroying animal habitat in the Hambacher Forest.
School initiatives also buy legitimacy and assuage resistance
against the mine. According to activists, at the ‘peak of resistance
against the mine’ in Buir, the company offered to build a new
‘mobile’ stage for the school auditorium ‘with sound system and
everything e and the expectation was to bring us “back on
track”’dan attempt to mitigate local concerns with the mine. The
West German Broadcasting (WDR) has reported agreements with
two secondary schools in the mining area, where RWE agreed to
offer school trips, internships and application trainings in return for
publicity in school publications, outreach and sign-boards (Wahl,
2015). The aim is to raise awareness among students about the
signiﬁcance of the coal industrye and to establish the company as a
caring neighbour and socially responsible corporation (in Wahl,
2015). In 2012, 250 RWE employees were active as ‘energy am-
bassadors’ providing information about RWE, coal power and other
energy industries in German schools (RWE, 2012). Not surprisingly,
in their teaching material, RWE promote the indispensability of
coal electricity and highlight the efﬁciency and ecological sustain-
ability of their power plants and signiﬁcance as a local employer.
The company even offers teaching material, including educational
videos, on the Hambach mine and the recultivated/offset areas -
once again attempting to brand coal mining as ecologically sus-
tainable in their struggle for political legitimacy.
Taken together, RWE's initiatives in schools resemble a coun-
terinsurgency approach called ‘generational engagement,’ which is
‘built on the foundation of education, empowerment, and partici-
pation’ to integrate people of all ages, including youth, ‘to partici-
pate in legal methods of political discourse and dissent’ as opposed
to questioning the dominant political and social orders (FM3-24,
2014: 10-2). We contend that, when applied in the framework of
‘corporate counterinsurgency’, generational engagement seeks to
create a ‘corporate culture’ (Dugger, 1989) encouraging participa-
tion, loyalty and buffering against social conﬂict or opposition by
inculcating in young people a pro-corporate/mining ideology.
5.4. New recreational infrastructure: neoliberal social
development?
Pro-corporate ideologies are also fostered by investments into
8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼VBHIpxVFi50.
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on former coal train trails and a signposted network of cycling and
hiking tours which showcase RWE's recultivationwork, coal mining
and other ‘extractive attractions.’ On the Straße der Energie (energy
route), a ‘tourist route through the Rhinish lignite mining area’
(RWE, n.d.), the visitor can witness RWE's mines, recultivation
work, processing facilities and electricity production from lignite
coal, wind and solar. These tours accompany numerous RWE pub-
lications outliningmaps, regional information and trail suggestions,
as well as general promotional material.
The most notable recreational infrastructure sponsored by RWE
is:terra nova (New Earth). Co-ﬁnanced by surrounding municipal-
ities (Regionale, 2010),:terra nova is a restaurant/bar and informa-
tion centre modelled after a beach resortdcomplete with sunbeds,
playground and outdoor gymdthat sits on a terrace overlooking
the Hambach mine (Fig. 2). In addition,:terra nova hosts RWE's
recultivation centre, a ‘wedding-room’ and a football-golf course.
The building can be rented for events and is promoted as a ‘meeting
place’ to ‘bring people together.’ Jim Igoe et al. (2010) application of
Guy Debord's (1994/1967) ‘spectacle’ to ecotourism becomes
insightful here, where the spectacle of ‘extractive attraction’ works
to further normalise the mining processes that are being militantly
resisted. In Uganda, Cavanagh and Benjaminsen (2014: 56) have
shown, ‘spectacularization’ is fundamental in the production of
carbon offsets that form a ‘process of interrelated accumulation and
naturalization by dispossession.’ In the Rhineland,:terra nova at-
tempts to do the same by solidifying a unifying message, justifying
the operation and encouraging people to participate as spectators,
while further commodifying and selling the mining experience.
Said simply,:terra nova seeks not only to mobilise popular support
but also tomake proﬁt in the process. Visitors from near and far, are
invited to enjoy the view, drinks, food and games, and applaud the
200 plus-meter long diggers, the ‘largest mobile machines of the
world’ (RWE Power, 2013a: 5), invoking fantasies of huge play-
grounds where soil is shifted and men have God-like control over
both machinery and nature.
Through this kind of spectacle, RWE's:terra nova attempts to
transform enormous machinery, holes and extractive routine into
an acceptable practice by means of marketing and encouraging
participation from locals and visitors as mining spectators. Now
parties rage (occasionally) and beer glasses cling over electrical
humming and grinding gears of mining operations, bundling the
‘ecotourism-extraction nexus,’ where extraction becomes integral
to eco-touristic experiences (Büscher & Davidov, 2013), into one
operationdmining tourism. The diversity of recreational opportu-
nities and ‘spectacular’ mining tourism infrastructure around the
Hambach mine help to invisibilise the violence required by the
mine. RWE's projects help mediate and transcend the assumed
contradiction between ecotourism and extractive industries by
providing recreational services. Sophienh€ohe and the extensive
network of cycling and hiking paths appease people's love for for-
ests, while:terra nova (and other recreational-educational sites)
romanticises notions of coalmining, providing an outlet for fasci-
nation with huge machinery that epitomises industrial progress,
modernity, and human mastery over nature. This accommoda-
tionist philosophy manufactures a ‘win-win’ for hikers, cyclists,
conservationists and mechanical enthusiasts, establishing a self-
reinforcing and inclusive approach that not only merges, but
simultaneously articulates the ecotourism-extraction nexus.
The resort-style beach landscape is no coincidence. RWE's long-
term management plans indicate that after the proposed mine
closure in 2045, Europe's ‘biggest hole’ is meant to be turned into
Germany's second largest lake by the end of the century. ‘It is
supposed to look like a shoreline,’ explains RWE employee Guido
Johnen (Wonnemann, 2013). This attempt to turn the present mineinto a future lake attempts to do just as their slogan proclaims:
‘looking into the present and the future’, creating a ‘positive’
landscape, not looking backwards, because ‘looking backwards can
be painful’ (Melzer, nd) e especially for those who experienced
displacement because of the mine. The sunbeds and parasols,
Melzer explains, ‘are invitations to wait for the water.’ RWE at-
tempts to market the re-imagining of the future, constructing a
win-win solution where coal mining leads to a better life and,
importantly, ‘better nature’, with a new lake and commercialised
recreational opportunities waiting at the end of the mining tunnel.
These new infrastructures are intimately tied to RWE's greening
efforts and claims of ecological sustainability, representing the
neoliberal belief in consensus and seductive win-win solutions,
based on the compatibility of capitalist growth and ecological
sustainability (Büscher et al., 2012) e but also the capturing of
imaginations founded on the erasure of the interconnectedness of
natures, spaces and previous inhabitants (human and nonhuman)
and the projection of new, artiﬁcial and mediated relations. This
erasure and reconstruction of interconnection is a discursive and
practical act of violence, which is being invisibilised by RWE's at-
tempts to ‘green’ mining.
5.5. ‘Greening’ the mine?
In order to ‘green’ mining and capture imaginations, RWE have
invested signiﬁcant efforts in ‘greenwashing’ their operations and
developing proﬁling itself as an environmentally responsible
corporate citizen. This is reﬂected, for instance, in the prominent
role of the green economy in PR campaigns. The campaign ‘voRWEg
gehen’, a wordplay that translates into ‘leading the way,’ has been
trying to establish RWE as environmental leader, causing contro-
versy in 2009 when their advertising clip8 featured signiﬁcant in-
vestments into renewable energy, when at the time only 2.7
percent of their energy was based on renewables (Lobbycontrol,
nd).
To ‘green’ their image, RWE also collaborates with conservation
and environmental NGOs, internationally (through the ‘Bettercoal
Initiative’), on company-level (with the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature, IUCN) as well as locally, through partner-
ships with nature volunteers and the Cologne Bureau for Faunistics.
The company has enrolled two very prominent German environ-
mentalists/academics from Germanwatch and the Wuppertal
Institute on its Corporate Responsibility Stakeholder Council. In
their leading role in the ‘Bettercoal Initiative,’ RWE claim to pro-
mote corporate sustainability in the international coal supply chain
by auditing and stakeholder engagement. Research participants,
however, criticise RWE for ‘outsourcing’ their responsibilities to
avert attention from their destructive operations. In the run-up to
the 2013 World Economic Forum in Davos, RWE announced its
cooperation with IUCN ‘for the protection of biological diversity’
(RWE, 2012b). As part of the partnership, two academics undertook
a study of RWE's biodiversity management and offsets around the
Hambach mine, recommending a more integrated biodiversity
management approach (Imboden & Moczek, 2015). In particular,
the report advocates a Payment for Ecosystem Services model,
discussing the ways investment risksddiminishing raw materials,
civil society ‘concerns’, capital access, regulatory risks, reputational
harm through media and NGO campaignsd could be turned into
proﬁtable business opportunities (Imboden & Moczek, 2015). The
report also recommends that if it is to ‘reduce the risk to its repu-
tation, RWE should not only adopt a more strategic approach to its
work on ecosystems, habitat and species but also pursue a more
Fig. 2. Terra nova e waiting for the water, Merzer, nd.
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and interacting with stakeholders’ (Imboden & Moczek, 2015: 31).
Recommendations further include company-wide biodiversity ob-
jectives, the planting of more native trees, inquiry into additional
measures to reduce the loss of the Hambacher Forest and ‘possible
compensatory measures’ e despite recognition that offsetting
measures ‘will never reach the biodiversity status of a mature for-
est’ (Imboden & Moczek, 2015, pp. 15e18). The partnership was
widely criticised by German IUCN member organisations, and has
thus not been renewed. This incident is but one illustration of the
extent to which RWE's nature conservationwork helps divide-and-
conquer the environmental community (cf. Brock, 2015) e by
enrolling local volunteers and conservation organisations, collab-
orating in biodiversity data collection and inviting them to their
restoration conference, where their work is showcased and praised.
In return, we are told, many environmentalists abstain from criti-
cising RWE's coal mining operations, and the cutting of the Ham-
bacher Forest.
The most important compensation measure e and heart of the
biodiversity management plan of the Hambach mine introduced
above e is the newly restored natural area and artiﬁcial low
mountain range called Sophienh€ohe adjacent to the mine. Some of
the former agricultural (and now reforested) areas are designated
for future timber harvesting (Schumacher et al., 2014: 28; in-
terviews), while the area is also used for recreational purposes. The
Sophienh€ohe contains 150 km of hiking and cycling trails leading to
visitor points on top of the hills and different ‘eye-catchers’
including a Celtic tree circle. RWE offers regular guided tours and
free maps to visit the area. Some trails are equipped with info-
boards with QR codes, for smart phone equipped visitorsdallow-
ing people to learn via LCD screen about ‘the new landscape and its
ﬂora and fauna’ (RWE Power, 2016). This information technology-
approach mediates the ‘visitor's’ relationship with their natural
environment, but also with the company. Hiking paths through the
Sophienh€ohe are not only heavily signposted but delineated by
bushes that keep the visitor on the path, resembling what Jeff
Ferrell (2012: 1688) calls ‘spatial environment[s] saturated with
contemporary ideologies of containment and exclusion.’ Policing
takes place through signs, rules and ‘natural grids’, but also throughvisual clues that promote self-identiﬁcation with the project and
hiking regulations. Individual agency or exploration beyond the
pre-planned trail is discouraged. Sophienh€ohe thus becomes a
highly regulated, predictable and enclosed environment e like city
parks positioned to serve as PR.
6. Criminalisation, repression and violence: RWE’S ‘Harder’
counterinsurgency techniques
The variety of ‘soft’ counterinsurgency approaches, in which
greening activities play an important role, help invisilibilise the
‘harder’ repressive techniques. Overlapping with RWE's divide-
and-conquer strategies we observe strategies of stigmatisation
and criminalisation of more ‘radical’ elements in the resistance
movement, leading at once to the isolation and violent repression
of environmental activists. In a newspaper interview, RWE CEO
Peter Terium speaks of activists as ‘criminals:’ ‘They have no ide-
ology, they are sheer criminals and are only interested in excessive
violence’ (Terium in Die Welt, 2016). Elsewhere, he describes the
Hambacher Forest as ‘unbearable escalation’, speaking of ‘profes-
sional demonstrators’, coming to ‘riot’ (in Balzter & Meck, 2016).
‘They come from other countries’, he continues ‘some from Eastern
Europe, some from a particular scene in England’, which plays into
xenophobic sentiments and fears of East European maﬁas that
often dominate German right-wing media. In the August 2013
edition of its neighbourhood magazine e coinciding with the
annual anti-coal climate camp e RWE displayed the resistance
movement as ‘vandals’ and life threatening to workers' (Fig. 3, RWE
Power, 2013b: 2), positioning activists as ‘violent’ and ‘radical’ e
whereas the company is engaged in ‘constructive dialogue’ (RWE
Power, 2013b: 3).
‘Dear neighbours,’ asks the chairman of the RWE workers'
council on the next page, ‘how would you react if you were sud-
denly attacked with rocks at work?’ The police union spreads
similar images of ‘violent protesters’, warning of a ‘spiral of
violence’, while ignoring not only the (physical) violence exercised
by police and security forces against activists, but also the structural
violence inherent in coal mining.
While criminalising the more ‘radical elements’, the company
Fig. 3. ‘Opinion yes, vandalism no,’ RWE Power, 2013b.
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Hambach mine. Yet opposition groups in the region contest the
company's narrative of ‘good relations’. As one member explains:
[RWE:] ‘the climate campers, they are rowdy, but the citizens’ ini-
tiatives […] we are in good dialogue with them’. But that's not true.
You can't be in dialogue with RWE. Dialogue is impossible […]. They
tried to buy us as ‘mediators’ […] you have to be very careful.
Other interviewees recall how they were repeatedly asked to
distance themselves from people engaging in ‘violent’ resistance.
One person describes: ‘They criminalise and divide […]. They tell
us: “Distance yourself from “the forest” [defenders]. They are all
criminals” […] and part of the press is complicit in this.’ This is a
textbook tactic to divide social movements (Gelderloos, 2013) and
exploit and create divisions between ‘the forest’ and other parts of
the resistance movement. Nonetheless, individuals and groups
continue to support and show solidarity with the more combative
parts of the movement, despite ‘occasional disagreement about
methods.’ Indeed, as one interviewee explains, the Hambacher
Forest ‘wouldn't be an “issue” without [their] illegal actions,
without cables burning, without the occupation. They [the forest
defenders] have been contributing so much [to the Hambach
struggle].’
Members of citizens' initiatives and ‘less radical’ groups have
also been the target of defamation. People who ‘engage politically,’
one research participant explains, are frequently silenced throughthe city council, political intervention and other means, while
stigmatised as ‘green wackos.’ Furthermore, protest ‘initiatives are
being stigmatised and criminalised […] through skilled press work
by different players, including politicians, trade unions, RWE and
the police.’ The citizens' initiative ‘Buirer for Buir’, for instance, was
denounced by the federal minister of transport at the opening
ceremony of the new highway as ‘liars’ who ‘manipulate people.’6.1. Prosecution and intimidation
The resistance movement has frequently been subject to court
cases and legal charges. In 2015 alone, RWE initiated legal action
against 800 activists and journalists following violent repression of
protest with pepper spray and batons that was openly criticised in
the mass-media (Blume, 2015). Restraining orders and law suits are
major tools of intimidation. Although most cases are quickly
dropped, others are used to set an example, especially when ac-
tivists refuse to identify themselves. Research participants report
arbitrary police harassment of activists, which includes the
conﬁscation of bicycles as ‘stolen’ if owners could not recite frame
numbers, searching of cars with bumper stickers in opposition to
the mine (Zimmermann, 2016), constant surveillance, stop-and-
search at the local train station as well as checkpoints that work
to create a ‘culture of fear.’ The Hambacher Forest occupation (and
surrounding areas) has been under ‘long-term surveillance’, as
authorised by the Aachen district court (Hambacher Forst, 2016c).
Both police and mine security have a constant presence around the
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2016). According to forest defenders, drones and helicopters have
also been used for surveillance purposes, and members of citizens'
initiatives have reported being followed by security services regu-
larly. This creates a situation of permanent tension, intimidation
and fear, to dissuade RWE opposition.
Beyond this culture of fear are concrete practices of threat and
intimidation. Activists have conﬁrmed reports of security guards
‘verbally engaging in rape fantasies as they intimidated ‘locked-on’
female activists while awaiting the police’ (EF!, 2015; interviews).
The climate camp has also been subject to threats and verbal at-
tacks by security guards, as well as threatening phone calls during
the night (Wyputta, 2012). One anti-mine organiser received
threats against them and their family, while the owner of the land
hosting the Hambach encampment reported his garage being
broken into and his car destroyed twice. Hambacher Forest activists
report police threatening them to break their ﬁngers and arms if
they did not collaborate in their ﬁngerprint collection (Hambacher
Forst, 2016a).
Intimidation of protesters continues online. RWE employees
created two Facebook groups, ‘For lignite coal and jobs, against eco-
extremism’ and ‘RWE-workers for fair reporting’, where coal pro-
ponents have been posting threats to activists (D€oschner, 2015).
These groups serve as a meeting point for RWE supporters, em-
ployees and climate change deniers, where they post verbal attacks
against coal critics, denounce activists as ‘eco-terrorists’ and pose
(death) threats. At the coal tour through the mine, we could hear
similar statements ourselves, for example when the bus driver
comments: ‘No digger should ever stop for those activists who
chain themselves onto it.’ The death of eco-activists isdconsciously
or unconsciouslydapplauded by RWE personnel, volunteers and
sympathetic politicians. As part of RWE's stakeholder dialogue, a
number of local politicians came to see the recultivation work,
suggesting that ‘someone should come and beat them [the activ-
ists] up,’ complaining about the police's inability to evict the forest
occupation and continuing that ‘in France, at least they are allowed
to shoot.’ There is a culture and institutionalisation of hate for those
concerned, protesting and acting to stop the mine.
The organisers of the annual Rhineland climate camps, accord-
ing to interviews, were confronted with repression from the
beginning, only to intensify with the second camp in 2012.
Research participants explained that farmers, (football) clubs and
other residents were pressured not to provide land, water or any
type of support for the camp. The local football club, for instance,
depends on RWE for advertising and sponsorship and is thus
vulnerable to these pressures, which we are told, ‘RWE exercises
with all available means’. Farmers are in an equally precarious
situation, one person explains: ‘if you're a farmer and need to swap
land in the future, you don't want to antagonise RWE. Because then
you'll get a piece of land in the Eifel [60 km away], not here.’ Un-
derneath the ofﬁcial promotional material and PR, RWE's opera-
tions articulate a style of clientelistic realpolitik.
This realpolitik coincides with the intimidation and suppression
of critical media reports. In April 2015, 6000 people formed a hu-
man chain (the ‘anti-coal-chain’) to protest coalmining in the
Rhineland. When the K€olner Stadt-Anzeiger, a large regional news-
paper reported ‘too positively’ on the event the following Monday,
one interviewee reports, RWE sent a delegation to the KStA
editorial ofﬁce to ‘exert pressure’ on the chief editorethreating
with mass-cancellation of subscriptions. The following day, a
double-page editorial was published in the super-regional edition
of the paper, entitled ‘Always accompanied by fear’ (Die Angst f€ahrt
mit), implying that RWE employees are under constant danger of
being attacked by ‘radical activists.’ Furthermore, people reported
instances of attacks on, and evictions of media representatives fromthe forest (Hissel, 2015). In 2016, a sympathetic ﬁlm maker was
severely injured by police forces and hospitalised (Funken, 2016b).
6.2. Physical violence
As Eveline Lubbers (1999) has argued, speaking about police/
corporate violence against activists in America: ‘violence is
designed to silence.’ Three groups have engaged in direct violent
action against protestors: workers, RWE security and police forces.
While the opinion of RWE workers towards the opposition varies
between individuals and throughout time, some forest defenders
reported attempts of citizen arrests, intimidation and beatings, as
well as the hosing down of activists with water in freezing tem-
peratures when locked-on to machineryda tactic ﬂagrantly dis-
played in Stand Rock.
Secondly, RWE security (technically only supposed to use self-
defence when under attack), have been documented hunting for-
est defenders and cutting tree house ropes (tomake activists fall six
metres to the ground), using pepper spray, wearing masks,
throwing rocks, using vehicles to intimidate or attack people,
slashing car tires in the encampment, as well as spitting on activ-
ists, and letting dogs loose to follow them. During lock-on actions,
security personnel actively beat people to the point of breaking
bones, teeth and other body parts, while sexually harassing female
activists.
The police have conducted themselves similarly to RWE secu-
rity. Forest defenders have reported serious injuries and abuse
during and following arrest. This includes sprained wrists, hae-
matomas, broken noses and ﬁngers, lost teeth and refusal of
medical treatment (Hambacher Forst, 2016b). Research participants
added that police pepper sprayed and kicked people's faces with
their boots and beat them outside as well as inside police custody
(Fig. 4). As mentioned earlier, the police are frequently surveying
the area with check points and occasionally with helicopters,
drones and monitoring cell phone communicationsdand forest
defenders suspect eavesdropping activities at nearby police
checkpoints. At times, the police have fully enclosed the camp,
enforcing a strict stop-and-search policy that prevents the move-
ments of forest defenders and consequently inhibiting their abili-
ties to acquire food and water for the encampment.
In 2015, after escalation of a protest, one of RWE's private em-
ployees admitted that ‘violence emanated from police and security
forces’ and reported a ‘euphoric’ mood among security personnel,
looking to pick ﬁghts (WDR, 2015). Compared to the political and
structural violence taking place around resource extraction sites in
Latin America, Asia and Africa, the violence seems mild. Nonethe-
less, the same model of extractive violence is present at a lower
intensity, with preference towards psychological and police
violence rather than heavily armed military and paramilitary op-
erations. To illustrate the differences and parallels: whereas in the
Rhineland, security personnel are reported to have threatened to
rape activists, in Southern Mexico and other counterinsurgency
operations rape is commonly deployed as a concerted military
tactic (Downey et al., 2010; Stephen, 2000). Even though less se-
vere, violence and threats of violence constitute an integral part of
corporate/state strategies to defuse opposition through integrated
‘soft’ and ‘hard’ techniques, which is the essence of
counterinsurgency.
7. Conclusion
The paper demonstrates the variety of corporate counterinsur-
gency strategies used to ‘stabilise public opinion,’ ‘pacify’ opposi-
tion and de-legitimise actions taken against RWE's migrating mine.
This includes working intimately with national and local civil
Fig. 4. Police eviction of Hambacher Forest, Perschke, 2013.
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teer programs, providing funding for schools, sponsoring research
funds, hosting cultural events, creating astroturf groups, creating
new infrastructure and re-making and/or marketing nature
through nature recultivation work which goes beyond legislative
requirements. These operations are complemented by RWE secu-
rity, employees and police actions to repress the existing and
recalcitrant social movement(s) forming against the mine and the
consequent destruction of the Hambacher Forest and surrounding
towns. These efforts to manage conﬂict and maintain legitimacy,
both the goal of CSR and counterinsurgency, lead to harnessing and
‘socially engineering’ not only political geography but also political
systems themselves. Following Foucault's (1979/2008: 150)
‘neoliberal art of government’, we see neoliberalism as embedding
counterinsurgency practices and/or mechanisms into everyday
practice, using market-mechanisms to ‘roll-back’ social amenities
and protectionsdto deprive people resources for civic participation
and/or protest, while also imbuing dependency on the population
to the operations of government and corporations (Peck and Tickell,
2002; Springer, 2016)dfurther entrenching and transforming state
power. Simultaneously, market mechanisms are ‘rolling-out’ or
intensifying state power, proliferating regulations and expanding
the joint public-private venture of ‘social engineering’ the
population.
The Rhinish counterinsurgency efforts are not ‘unique.’ The
recent article series by Brown et al. (2017) in The Intercept analysing
the leaked TigerSwan documents reveals the centrality of coun-
terinsurgency for undermining the Standing Rock anti-pipeline
social movement. The documents conﬁrm integrated collabora-
tion between company security, Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA),
federal, state and local police agencies, revealing a series of tactics
used by authorities against Standing Rock, which were also present
in the Hambach forest. These include aerial surveillance (helicop-
ters, drones), radio eavesdropping, hacking domestic communica-
tions (cell phones, internet, etc.), social media, PR (‘social
engagement plans’), undercover police and collaborating in-
formants (Brown et al., 2017). The cases of Standing Rock and
Hambacher Forest stress the importance of corporate counterin-
surgency as a lens of analysis and critical scholarly engagement.Counterinsurgency reveals a continuity of repression and ‘social
engineering’ that allows us to peer into the decisions of govern-
ments and resource extraction companiesd‘political reactions
“from above”’. Counterinsurgency is about ‘social engineering,’
securingd‘holding’dand creating conditions that allow the
completion of particular objectives: coal extraction, shareholder
revenue and the organisational existence of RWE, which is inti-
mately tied with the imperatives of the German state and its po-
litical economy. To reach these goals, RWE and the German state
not only have to deal with increasingly militant resistance, but also
work with novel imaginaries and narratives to ‘re-shape the past
and re-imagine the future,’ through processes of naturalization and
normalisation of coal and the (discursive) creation of a ‘better na-
ture’ e as well as the positioning of RWE as a good corporate citi-
zen. These narratives and practices are embedded in wider
processes of social control, exploitation, injustices and violence, as
industrial capitalism and extractivism require the colonisation of
hearts, minds, land and nature alike.
Colonising hearts, Kilcullen reminds us, involves ‘persuading
people their best interests are served by your success’ e as RWE
does through discourses of energy security, the threat of black-out,
employment needs and local energy provision as well as the
alleged need to continue the current trajectory of development and
ﬁnancial growth. ‘Minds,’ meanwhile, refers to ‘convincing them
that you can protect them, and that resisting you is pointless,’
which is done by dividing, ‘pacifying’ and repressing opposition. In
addition to legitimising RWE's coalmining activities, counterin-
surgency practices serve to habituate people into enchanting (in-
dustrial) lifestyles with the promise of new freedoms and
experiences with new technologies, a ‘better nature’ and a ‘better
future’, ignoring the plethora of social, ﬁnancial and ecological
signs that conﬁrm this path as self-destructive, ecologically un-
sustainable and creating social instability and/or conﬂict. Conse-
quently, human relationships to nature become mediated through
(commercialised) touristic experiences and recreational opportu-
nities, while the inherent systemic violence is normalised, pro-
claimed as the ‘higher good,’ and subsequently invisibilised.
The Straße der Energie (energy route), and Sophienh€ohe merge
mining (and biodiversity offsets) with a particular type of
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of resistance, these projects appear as a type of low-intensity
‘counterinsurgency ecotourism’ (Devine, 2014: 984), which com-
bines the ecological violence of extractive industries with that of
conservation and land control (Peluso & Lund, 2011; Sullivan,
2006). Following Marijnen and Verweijen's (2016: 276) ‘milita-
risation by consumption,’ this represents a low-intensity and subtle
articulation of ‘consumption by militarisation’ that encourages
residents to consume drinks and food, spectacularised mining ex-
periences and ‘new natures’, while simultaneously attempting to
discredit resistance through indirectly persuading the hearts and
minds of the general public. ‘Consumption by militarisation’ allows
RWE to capture, degrade/transform ecosystems and then ‘out-
source’ experiences of nature that the people from Buir, a village
adjacent to the Hambacher Forest, could experience by simply
leaving their front doors. In short, RWE is ‘grabbing green’ through
constructing new natures (Corson, MacDonald, & Neimark, 2013)
and playing a particular politics of accumulation by conservation
(Büscher & Fletcher, 2015) or, more accurately, accumulation by
restoration (Huff and Brock, forthcoming). Sophienh€ohe transforms
nature into a destination, separate fromordinary human life and re-
sold as a single serving experience between work weeks, while the
earth is mined and old-growth forests are destroyed. Meanwhile,
recultivation offsets help to construct corporate oxymorons of
‘sustainable coal’ or ‘green mining’ (Kirsch, 2010; see; Sullivan,
2013), fundamental to the company's legitimacy, as it claims to
‘upgrade nature,’ to create a ‘better nature’ and a ‘better future’
through the use of green economic logic, novel spectacles and
narratives. Offsetting here not only secures the continued accu-
mulation by restoration, but also constitutes a managerial tech-
nique or mode of governance (Brock, 2015), to silence critics and
undermine current and future resistance. In sum, mining and
counterinsurgency are constantly enforcing, by others means, the
stabilisation of ‘progress’ that wreaks social and ecological havoc,
entrenching unsustainable pleasures and conveniences that pre-
vent or dissuade imagining ecologically sensitive life ways and
alternative development practices.
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